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Abstract 
During the late-eighteenth to late-nineteenth centuries, practices of duelling and prize fighting 
were criminalized in Britain, while boxing remained legal. Through a genealogical method, this 
paper locates discourses, primarily law, medicine, policing and science, to trace these 
mechanisms of criminalization and legalization. Focusing on the jurisdictions of the United 
Kingdom and the United States, I argue that the legalization of boxing did not simply emerge as 
a part of a ‘civilizing process’. Rather, I explain these processes of criminalization and 
legalization in the context of biopolitical rationalities of governance. In contrast to its 
contemporaries, boxing was rationalized as a scientific ‘sport’ that fitted with wider biopolitical 
visions of public health and well-being: allegedly it did not breed violence or threaten the public 
peace but was instead practised by skilled technicians. However, the biopolitical management of 
human life within rational and scientific form comes at a price: life’s ontological need for 
expression, and the drive to experience and witness boxing’s corporeal excesses remains a 
ghostly presence threatening to undo the sweet ‘science’.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Duelling, prize fighting and boxing were contested practices in a period of rapid social change. 
Judicial duels, otherwise known as ‘trials by combat’, were publically sanctioned modes of 
punishment within a theological worldview that proclaimed the accused innocent or guilty in the 
eyes of God and the sovereign. Modern duels, imported from the Continent in the late sixteenth 
century, succeeded judicial duels that concluded in England in the fifteenth century. Though 
technically a criminal act, upper-class gentlemen partaking in modern duels were typically 
granted exceptional status in law, avoiding conviction. If duellists were punished, it was usually 
with a monetary fine. Prize fighting, by contrast, while gambled on by these moneyed classes, 
was considered an activity of the delinquent lower social echelons and held a firm ‘criminal’ 
status in law. Changes to the English law in the late-eighteenth to late-nineteenth century saw the 
criminalization of duelling between ‘men of honour’ and a final stamp down on the ‘brutal’ 
custom of prize fighting. However, one activity, ‘boxing’, never did encounter the law in the 
same way. 
Through a genealogical approach to historicizing crime and the construction of criminal 
subjects (e.g. Garland, 1997, 2014; Rafter, 2005), I explore how boxing plausibly circumvented 
criminalization and emerged as a legitimate ‘sport’, in contrast to duelling and prize fighting, 
which were cast as criminal and excessive. I aim to locate the discourses of law, medicine, 
policing and science to trace these processes of criminalization and legalization. As Foucault 
(1991: 82) writes: “The search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it 
disturbs what was previously thought immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; its shows 
the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself.” Genealogy does not endeavour to 
produce a ‘true’ narrative, though it ought to be credible and uphold the rigours of historical 
research evidence (Castel, 1994). I selected historical evidence with the intent to present a 
plausible story about the development of boxing with this genealogical aim in mind. I drew on 
pamphlets, news items, popular literature along with legal cases and statute from the late-
eighteenth-century to the present day, across the jurisdictions of the UK and the USA, to 
construct this genealogy. Analyzing archival and historical documents genealogically 
demonstrates that the rationalization of boxing is not an inevitable result of historical processes. I 
do not argue as others have elsewhere that boxing, and thus subsequent practices of mixed 
martial arts (MMA), emerged as part of a long-term historical, ontologically dialectical civilizing 
process (Elias, 1986; Dunning, 1990: Sheard, 1997; Brent & Kraska, 2010). Instead, I aim to 
understand how processes of criminalization and legitimation emerged amongst contested 
knowledges produced through discursive regimes.  
I argue that boxing was justified because it mapped onto, and attempted to contain itself, 
within the scientific rationalities developed throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Three key developments made this possible. The first was the secularization of 
medicine and the rise of a public health agenda. At the end of the eighteenth century, the ascent 
of medical science contributed to the setting that enabled boxing to materialize as a sanitized 
sport. The second was the rise of police sciences and its security agenda. These two discursive 
regimes emerged in a period wherein medical practitioners operated increasingly as uniting 
bodies that intervened at the level of the population rather than individual and, likewise, police 
emerged as key arbitrators of public health (Foucault, 2014). Finally, and most centrally to this 
paper, were the disciplinary formations forged by boxers: the ‘mundane technologies’ they 
employed, and the techniques they embodied (see Downey, 2007). Boxing was championed 
through its rationalization as ‘scientific’; it was technical, controlled, and thus compatible with a 
‘biopolitical’ public health agenda. This health agenda and the scientific rationale of boxing also 
explicitly emerged within a liberalizing economic context that focused on the production of 
capital. Together these three things – the secularization of medicine, the rise of police sciences, 
and the scientization of boxing, sanctioned boxing as a sanitized practice that avoided 
criminalization, unlike its duelling and prize fighting counterparts.  
 
The Secularization of Medicine and the Rise of Police Sciences  
Medicine emerged amongst a widespread secular shift away from pre-Enlightenment religion 
and traditionalism towards scientific study. ‘Traditional cures’ exceeding rational judgment and 
empirical observation dissipated as medical practice turned into medical science. Its scientific 
development was particularly important, for it saw a ‘multiplication of doctors, new hospitals, 
free health clinics and increased consumption of treatment in every class of society’ (Foucault, 
2014:114). As the scientific credibility of medicine rose, so too did doctors’ social status. 
Likewise, the role of medicine changed significantly. No longer simply an intervention in the 
lives of individuals, medicine was transformed into a focus on public health agendas that took 
the population as its target. The ‘well-being’ of society, as Foucault (2014) wrote, was as a 
central feature of modern medicine.  
In keeping with their new-found role in public health governance, medical practitioners 
engaged in new modes of health calculation. Medical science intersected with epidemiological 
techniques of mapping to look at health and medicine as a collective strategy, rather than merely 
dealing with individual bodies (Broglio, 2013). Political arithmetic’s emergence as a new ‘Art of 
governance’ also shaped medicine because it made it possible to look at the ‘population’ and 
thus make the ‘…judicious parallel between the Body Natural and the Body Politik’ (Porter, 
1986: 19). Significant political changes also took place as part of an overarching rationalization 
of society.  Medical doctor and philosopher, John Locke’s, political liberalism was to become the 
bedrock of seventeenth and eighteenth-century politics, in the same way that Adam Smith’s late 
eighteenth-century economic liberalism was to ground classical political economics. Feudal 
aristocracy’s decline and capitalism’s emergence reflected a shift in political governance from 
what Foucault defined as ruling over principalities or ‘territory’ toward governing more 
indirectly over ‘populations’. This indirect management that Foucault (1999, 2008) termed 
‘biopolitical’ required the cultivation of agentic individuals within the population whole. It 
required the creation of good liberal self-governing economic actors who could internalize the 
norms of the marketplace and those of moral and legal order. It was here that the two ‘poles’ of 
governance as Foucault suggested – of individualizing discipline and totalizing biopolitics - 
dovetailed one another, enabling the synonymous management of individuals and the wider 
population. 
Political technologies such as the rise of statistics and political arithmetic were central to 
this new ‘art’ of governance: they enabled the population to appear as a target. Through these 
technologies, medical science found a unique role in society that brought together the art of 
healing with another art: that of security. Writing in the early nineteenth-century, medical 
practitioners began to use the terms’ medical jurisprudence’, ‘state medicine’ and other concepts 
that increasingly linked medicine and security (Ryan, 1836; Wecht, 2005). Medical practitioners 
were also brought into the realm of justice as medical scientists as they engaged more closely 
with the law through the rise of forensic sciences in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.  
If medical practitioners had as their new object the security of the population, so too did 
police have the population as its target. ‘Police’ here does not merely refer to the modern 
institution of police associated with law enforcement. Policing instead developed as an art of 
managing a population’s ‘forces’; its focus was on the production and protection of wealth and 
the promotion and management of health, these two facets connected through the concept of 
‘well-being’ (Foucault, 2007: 326, 328). Police governed ‘men’s coexistence with each other’ 
(Foucault, 2007: 326), and were responsible for the ‘sociality’ of persons: individual well-being 
was equivalent to the state’s strength (2007: 328/9). Policing thus fulfilled a biopolitical 
function, one that had to govern the individual subject whose actions were to be understood in 
relation to the activities of, and governance of, the wider population.  
Medicine and policing were thus twin techniques of governance that assured ‘public 
good’, ‘beyond tranquillity and good order’: the police didn’t just surveil and maintain this order 
but instead ‘…constituted a complete administration of the social “body’”’ (Foucault, 2014: 
116). During the late eighteenth to the nineteenth-century, medical and police sciences formed a 
backdrop to the political landscape against which practices of duelling, prize fighting and boxing 
were torn down, and actively reconstructed. 
 
Biopolitics and Excesses 
Where the development of medical and police sciences map onto a Foucaultian account of 
biopolitics, Roberto Esposito’s work adds another layer of meaning (2008, 2010, 2011). He 
agrees with Foucault that biopolitics is a mode of power developed from a security agenda 
focusing on the protection of life. However, from Esposito’s vantage, biopolitics is not so 
different from sovereign modes of governing. Instead, sovereignty and biopolitics share a central 
political logic, referred to as ‘immunization’, that seeks to protect and shelter life from the 
excessive obligations of community. The aim of governance in whichever form it takes is to 
‘immunize’ individual life, sheltering it “from an unbearable excess’, writes Esposito (2006: 28). 
Historically shifting modes of governance – from sovereignty, to discipline, to biopolitics - 
evolve to curb ‘excesses’ that threaten individual human life. ‘Excess’ here refers to types of 
knowledge (e.g., theological/God, spiritual, magical); physical practices (e.g., corporeal, animal, 
religious.); dangers posed by others in one’s community (e.g., violent, criminal subjects); and 
political regimes that also endanger the individual (e.g., totalitarian). Each of these excesses risks 
the protection of individual units of human life within a political community and threatens the 
stable ‘order of things’.  
The stable order of things is historically and progressively expanded to protect individual 
life within a common mode of being. It is not a natural order but, instead, has taken root through 
the construction of ‘scientific progress’ and the ‘civilization of society’, made possible through 
the descriptive containment of concepts, the legitimation of ways of governing, and the fixing of 
specific forms of ‘being’ to morality (i.e. the discursive use of concepts to create a normative 
moral order). Bringing Foucault and Esposito together, one can say that throughout the historical 
formations of sovereignty politics and biopolitics, the stable order of things has been assembled 
through: the securitization of society; the promotion of population health and well-being; and the 
individualization of techniques of governance that creates disciplined subjects. Political 
liberalism and neoliberalism are examples of governmental regimes that actively construct 
closures around subjects through personhood, property and rights in the name of ‘protection’. 
Said protection, however, divides us from one another in increasingly immunized ways at the 
expense of belonging to the wider community. This backdrop is vital for the current paper for 
several reasons. Biopolitics focuses on the well-being of the population and the securitization of 
this population from risk through the regulation and protection of individual life. Human 
physical practices that had historically been morally and legally acceptable, were subject to 
newly emerging norms and ways of containing life’s excesses to ‘protect’ life itself. Duelling, 
prize-fighting and boxing were among these practices.  
Talking of excesses is also essential for at least three further reasons.  Where the human 
body is both discursive and material, dominant meanings seek to contain it, but it also has an 
ontological need for expression. Excess helps us consider how political rationalities like 
biopolitics seek to construct and constrain bodily materialities. As Esposito (2006) notes, power 
is both protective and destructive; it negates life as well as enhances its development. Affect as 
excess cannot be expressed by discourse alone: it is extra-discursive (Massumi, 2002). ‘The 
living body’, writes Walby (2000) ‘…is excessive, unpredictable, [and] organized through 
unquantifiable forces of meaning and desire, as well as [having] complex, nonfunctional kinds of 
organic drive’ (2000: 144).  
Second, science as a discourse of progress is aligned with and is shaping ofa governance 
rationality that attempts to curb excessive types of knowledge and material practices. Scientific 
‘progressiveness’ is thus not a ready-made truth. ‘Advancements’ sometimes fail to ‘civilize’ and 
instead replicate problematic, unethical norms. The ascent of medical and police sciences and 
their emergent technologies helped rationalize boxing as that which was seen to curb excesses 
and create the right ‘kinds of people’ who could fulfil the promise of biopolitical governance, 
unlike duelling and prize fighting. 
Finally, in Esposito’s account at least, excess is vital for the development of what he calls 
an affirmative biopolitics. Life’s ontological need for expression is curbed by biopolitics’ 
fundamental feature: life’s protection. Security is achieved at the expense of life itself (Esposito, 
2008). One must, therefore, not only consider how powerful discourses shaped boxing’s 
legitimacy, but also how discourses yield to give space to certain forms of corporeal expression 
in controlled, sanitized form. This reflection is particularly salient given the need to balance 
immunization, the drive to protect life, and the parallel pull of community, the need to give life 
space to express itself. Excess, and therefore boxing bodies, thus have what Butler calls 
‘disruptive promise’ (1991: 315). 
 
Duelling and Prize Fighting as Excesses 
Dealing with personal disputes in private was one challenging excess to which police sciences 
had to attend. Despite often leading to the death of at least one of the parties, duelling was, until 
the mid-eighteen-hundreds, granted an ‘exceptional’ status in law whereby a subject who killed 
an opponent in a duel was not typically convicted of murder (Peltonen, 2003; Jager, 2005; 
Banks, 2012). Despite reviling the practice of duelling himself, as the English philosopher, jurist, 
and social reformist Jeremy Bentham (1843) recognized, such private dispute resolution was 
regarded as a practice of gentlemen and a necessary way of filling a lacuna of law. 
The decline of duelling and prize fighting was, arguably, in large part, due to the rise of 
medical and police sciences. Both medicine and policing sought to secularise society: health and 
justice became part of a moral public good that was an art of governing subjects as secular 
beings. Where duelling had once shared a lineage with God-given justice, it became simply a 
measure of justice between two all-too-human subjects.  
Somewhat contrastingly, however, duellers remained threatened with a sacred form of 
punishment that would make the body profane: into late eighteen-hundreds religious convictions 
were often enough to steer persons away from duelling given the threat of bodily dissections that 
were becoming a problematic legal issue. A shortage of cadavers could not be sustained through 
criminal bodies alone (see Frank, 1976) and changes in the US federal law passed in 1790 
allowed judges to add dissection to the death sentence for murder. Dissection was intended to 
discourage socially disruptive crimes. In 1784 Massachusetts passed a law stating that ‘…a slain 
duelist would either be buried in a public place without a coffin or given to a surgeon for 
dissection’ (Tward & Patterson, 2002). Medicine was also in a secular transition period: many 
still believed that the dissection of the body after death was worse than dying because it would 
impede afterlife. 
This secularization of crime and justice joined a shift towards the public distribution of 
justice that police sciences encapsulated. Despite garnering upper and middle-class patronage – 
including lawyers and doctors, senior members of government and prominent persons such as the 
English Prime Minster— duelling declined slowly. While the duel was, at one point, justified as 
a ‘safety valve’ and ‘regulator of aggression’ others described it as ‘despotic’ and ‘beyond’ law 
(Stone, 1965 cited in Andrew, 1980: 411). The development of a modern biopolitical state 
concerned with a security agenda applied to ‘each and all’ had to appear at least to abide by 
Weber’s (1919) claim that it had a monopoly on violence. Duelling was thus transformed from 
an excessive ‘art of manliness’ to a shameful act. Those of the upper ranks were to conform to 
democratic laws. Published in the Edinburgh Magazine and taken from Dr Boyd’s text ‘Justice 
of Peace’ in 1790 it was declared: duelling ‘tramples under foot every principle of law, reason, 
religion and nature’ (39). While duelling’s criminalization was heavily linked to egalitarian 
totalizing principles, it was also linked to individualizing modes of governance, the other ‘pole’ 
of biopower. One prominent thesis underpinning duelling’s decline was the replacement of the 
Enlightenment prospect of dying for honour with political liberalism’s immunizing tendency 
toward “self-preservation” (see Andrews, 1980). 
Medical practitioners also entered the discussion of duelling, as medical science 
overlapped further with policing. In his significant 1803 text ‘Medical Ethics’ Dr Percival 
referred to Sir Francis Bacon’s claim that ‘A man’s life is not to be trifled away; it is to be 
offered up and sacrificed to honourable services, public merits, good causes, and noble 
adventures’ (Bacon, 1838: 88). Percival argued that the code of honour, underscored by nothing 
more than a ‘private quarrel’ ought not to be linked to an individual liberal subject but instead 
must be suitable for society. ‘The healing art is a public good, beneficial to the poor as well as to 
the rich’, wrote Percival, and duelling, as a private problem, could not be reconciled within this 
collective system (1803: 123).  
In England, duelling was finally made a specific criminal offence in 1803 under The 
Statutes of George III, though this offence lacked application until later in 1844. Stell (1979) 
argues that this was when Prime Minister Peel revised army pension statute to deny widows of 
duellists pensions. Some cases have been cited as evidence that English law had never 
sanctioned duelling and that its subjects were convicted of murder if a party of the duel was 
deceased through the act. R v Brown (1993), for example, cites the case of R v Rice (1803), in 
which a subject was found guilty of murder for inflicting a fatal wound during a duel. However, 
Stell (1979) argues that the law was not generally applied and that duelling had been exempted; 
evidence is found in the October 1814 Edinburgh Review that professed: ‘this law is a mere dead 
letter…no instance is known of the law being executed against any person for being engaged in a 
duel, fought in what is called a fair manner’ (74). 
Prize fighting, also known as pugilism or bare-knuckle boxing, which involved fighting 
between professionals who competed for their own money as well as for gambling men, also 
steadily declined during the nineteenth century. Before its transformation into the sweet science 
of boxing, organized fighting was lucrative. It was also popular among those in positions of 
political and economic power. It, too, encouraged the settling of disputes between men of lower 
classes, outside and exceeding the law. Or, it inspired the fighting for prizes between these lower 
classes of men, as well as exciting the gambling excesses of men from higher society. Both 
aspects of prize fighting threatened public peace. Gambling’s connection to divination through 
its irrational faith in risk-taking was also excessive (Ramey, 2015) and incompatible with 
rational choice Enlightened actors. Excesses of ‘God, spirit, magic’ were ‘not generally 
understandable’ through science (Harvey et al., 2014). Despite also being revered by some 
significant ‘gentlemen’ such as the US President Roosevelt, prize fighting was also not granted 
exceptional status in English law. An 1802 article’ Eulogy of Boxing and Cock Fighting’ 
castigated bare-knuckle boxing’s methods of ‘…hair pulling, head-butting, eye gouging, gut-
kneeing, and neck throttling’ (see Marren, 2013). It did not conform to the civilizing narrative of 
science but instead could be described as an ‘incontinent manifestation of excess’ (Woodward, 
2007: 59).  Indeed, the law also reflected this view. The English case of R v Orton (1878) 
stipulated that skilled sparring was not criminal but instances where parties fought ‘…till one 
gave in from exhaustion or injuries’ constituted an illegal prize fight. Likewise, R v Coney 
(1882) also famously reasserted prize fighting’s criminality. In a judgment that referred to a 
previous case of R v Ward (1872), which suggested that every fight containing an element of a 
violent trade of blows was illegal, Coney firmly established prize fighting as “a breach of the 
peace” (1882: 567).   
Together, duelling and prize fighting became regarded as savage practices, which 
civilized governance mechanisms should manage and contain. These practices threatened to 
exceed the stable order of things: a society formulated on the population’s health and well-being 
and collective security. Deferring to the ‘animal’ part of man, these practices were improperly 
human. 
 
The Science and Sanitation of Boxing 
Where duelling and prize fighting were eventually criminalized, boxing, by contrast, emerged as 
a ‘public good’. The legal decision in Coney, since upheld in R V Brown (1993) and further fixed 
in the Reform of the Offenses Against the Person Act (2015), reflected the view that boxing was 
“in the public interest”. Boxing did not “rouse angry passions” or “produce mischief” (Coney, 
1882: 554). However, this construction and maintenance of boxing as publically valuable had to 
circumvent two problems. First, like its contemporaries, boxing had also been considered a sport 
of brutes. Medical practitioners’ labelling of head injuries from prize fighting in the nineteen-
twenties as ‘punch drunk’ syndrome could have threatened boxing’s public image (Clancy, 
2006). Boxing thus had to be rationalized as a practice that was, on the contrary, a sport for 
gentlemen that promoted well-being. Where gentlemen had engaged in the ‘manly arts’ of 
duelling and gentlemen had also bet on prize fighters, boxing also had to distance itself from 
excessive, non-instrumental accounts of violence; it had to become a practice that would not 
threaten the established order of things (security, crime control, justice, and so on). 
Arguably several things made this possible. The first was the ability of influential figures 
to distance boxing practices from these counterparts. This construction of boxing was not 
happenstance but instead emerged through shifting discourses in medicine and policing; through 
new knowledges constructed by medical practitioners, fighters themselves, promoters, those 
involved in policing, as well as media publishers. An obvious rationale for this scientific 
construction was economic vantage: the ability to develop and protect an income stream. Where 
boxing had its roots in prize fighting practices, talks in the eighteen-hundreds between medical 
practitioners, prize fighters, as well as publicists turned to the scientific method of boxing that 
would move away from brutish slugging. They actively fashioned boxing as a sweet science of 
‘sparring’ as opposed to ‘fighting’: the latter being an activity of brutes with the intent to harm 
and breach the peace; the former being an activity of men (predominantly), who engaged in 
civilized, scientific, rational processes of disciplining the body.  
  Many credit the scientific method to the American fighter, James Corbett, whose school 
of scientific boxing was born out of his win against popular fighter John Sullivan in 1892. His 
educated background and application of a scientific method earned him the nickname 
‘Gentleman Jim’. As medical doctor R. C. MacDonald recorded, the scientific method would 
require two gentlemen to spar for ‘scientific mastery’ ‘without being compelled to undergo a 
long and arduous prize fight training’.  Hard hitting and ‘slugging’, as it was known, was 
replaced with a quick and sharp blow:  
If the fighter is “born, not made,”…. the opposite is true of the boxer. That our present 
system of so-called boxing is merely natural fighting is beyond the need of proof; and as 
fighting and scientific boxing are by no means necessarily conjunct, an experiment which 
separates them should be welcomed by all true amateurs. (MacDonald, 1892).  
The aim was to ‘…show superior science’, wrote MacDonald. While ‘hard-hitting’ remained 
essential, there was a ‘material difference’ between this and ‘slugging’, between a ‘quick and 
sharp blow’ that demonstrated intellect of a ‘clever, gentlemanly set-to’, and ‘vicious swings’ 
that ‘were ‘dealt with the desire to injure’. ‘Who can doubt that, when under the new rules men 
come together, each will do his cleverest work? Who can doubt that such a spirit will result in 
true science?’ (MacDonald, 1892).  
Scientific boxing’s sanitization was also important contextually. US Reformists of the 
Progressive Era wanted prize fighting abolished as it didn’t reflect the country’s aspirational 
middle-class values (Frisbee, 2011). Police and local governors in some US states supported the 
prize fights but were under pressure to enforce the law. The scientifically driven position of 
progressivist reformists further pushed boxing towards a cleaner, purer sport. On the other side 
of the pond, English prize fights weathered similar storms within a deeply entrenched class 
system. British public opinions of boxing also shifted after rule changes meant that boxing could 
also be promoted more openly in the mainstream media, and people felt they could support 
boxers (Frisbee, 2011). The similarity between UK and US jurisdictions is not surprising despite 
the different social contexts. Boxing emerged transnationally: boxing sites across the 
Anglosphere were connected ‘…but not in any structured or standardized fashion’ (Taylor, 2013: 
233). In both jurisdictions boxing’s legal status was uncertain. Likewise, ‘…no one nation or city 
remained the hub of the Anglophone boxing world across this period’ (Taylor, 2013: 233). 
Boxing was a ‘culture of mobility’, its entertainment spread across nations with fighters 
emigrating or travelling to compete (Taylor, 2013). 
Scientific boxing not only established its practitioners as rational, intelligent subjects, but 
it also overcame another problematic for biopolitical governance and security regarding harm. 
Differentiating itself from fighting’s ‘instinct’, boxing identified as an ‘artificial method’ crafted 
through study, practice, and above all, through the application of science itself (MacDonald, 
1892). The separation of nature from science also distanced boxing from the negative 
anthropology that underpinned prize fighting engaged in by lower class brutes, and that 
eventually underpinned duelling, regarded as uncivilized. Science made boxers rational, human 
subjects – or ‘proper persons’ (Esposito, 2012) with corporealities that could enact expressions 
of force through choice. This expression of human scientific boxers confined violence to the 
space of the ring, contra to cultural spill-over theory’s warning that a fighter’s innate violence 
would threaten the social order when he or she stepped outside the ring.  
Contemporary technology studies scholars examining combat sports also argue that these 
practices reflect scientific processes rather than base instincts. Downey (2007: 221), for instance, 
depicts ‘fighting techniques’ as ‘cumulative processes and tinkering with the body’ whereby 
human physiology is ‘plastic.’ ‘Ironically, combat sports, unlike many other sports, are often 
treated as limited versions of an allegedly natural human activity: fighting,’ writes Downey 
(2007: 222), which is problematic because fighting is scientific and technical. Constructing 
boxing as scientific meant that violence was not regarded as the excessive violence of a natural 
man who would undo the proper social order; instead, it was man-made violence created through 
rational scientific means that could be moderated. Scientifically-made emotion – in this case, 
violent emotion- could be expressed in the ring not as a base animalistic instinct like that which 
was allegedly found in prize fighters or even perhaps in duellers - but as manageable human 
expression. This account is quite different from Norbert Elias’s (1986) civilizing thesis, which 
considered boxing an outlet for aggressive tendencies innate in humankind, particularly in men 
whose virile masculinity led them to the fight.  Instead, violence is not a natural concept. Science 
made emotion and constructed ‘violence’ in appropriate forms.  
 
Mundane Technologies 
Also referred to as ‘invisible technologies’ (Borgmann, 1984), mundane technologies were 
imperative in the formation of fight sports as human sports contained within rule-bound 
environments and practised by ‘rational’ subjects: indeed, ‘the structure of the fighting space, the 
standardization of clothing, and lightweight gloves’ were mundane technologies that changed the 
landscape of boxing drastically (Downey, 2007: 201). Maintaining rule-bound behaviour and 
following safety precautions with the help of mundane technologies effectively undercut the 
view that boxers aimed to harm. Boxing gloves, known as ‘mufflers’, were introduced as part of 
the Broughton rules in 1743 and later the London Prize Ring rules in 1838 and the Queensbury 
rules in 1867, to differentiate bare-knuckle fighting from the sport of boxing, the uncivilized 
brawls of brutes from the competition of men. Fighter, John ‘Jack’ Broughton, regarded as the 
father of English boxing, introduced these rules after he injured another man in a fight that later 
led to the man’s death. Broughton’s rules were then developed into the London Prize Ring rules 
formed by the Pugilistic society in 1838. John C. Chambers, who established the Amateur 
Athletic Club, was also influential in shaping boxing as a “manly art” partaken in by gentlemen. 
Chambers and John Sholto Douglas (the Marquis of Queensberry) later revised these London 
Prize Ring rules to eliminate brutalism and potential bodily harm leading to the 1867 Marquis of 
Queensberry rules, which applied to amateur boxing. This framing of boxing as that which 
would test gentlemen in physical bouts marked a turning point from prize fighting’s brutal 
history towards the science of boxing. Seen to protect boxers, the glove played a significant role 
in distancing boxing from its bloody legacy, shaping it in the interest of population health.  
Despite the glove’s apparent sanitization of boxing, it was still legally unclear where 
boxing stood. Where the 1878 R v Orton case had established prize fighting’s illegality, it had 
also stipulated that the gloved hand would not place a fighter above the law. As Taylor (2013: 
236) notes, a contest in 1889 between English and Australian heavy weight champions at 
London’s Pelican Club was considered ‘of an illegal character’ despite the use of gloves, but the 
fighters were not convicted due to lack of evidence. Various other court cases between 1898 and 
1901 also challenged boxing’s legality but ‘…as one writer to The Times noted…so long as the 
“knock-out” is tolerated every glove contest tumbles on the verge of legality’ (Taylor, 2013: 
236).  
Despite its legal ambiguity, medical and police sciences arguably provided a backdrop of 
well-being that made associations between sport training, health and population protection 
biopolitically necessary. As Braidotti summarises, there is a ‘moral nature of technological tools 
as agents that can guide human decision making on normative issues’ (2013: 41). The gloved 
hand held its own morality.  
Introducing gloves to differentiate animalistic from human practices, however, had a 
somewhat different effect. The apparently mundane technology of the glove changed the sport of 
boxing in unintended ways (Gentry, 2001: 155). Rather than limiting knock-outs, the glove 
incited them. The glove also changed the embodied experience of the fighter. In the same way 
that ‘shoes affect how we walk and the physiology of the foot; gloves convince humans that it is 
easy to hurt each other with blows from the hands’ (Downey, 2007: 220). Introduced to ‘appease 
critics’, gloves made punching more effective, ‘pleasing many spectators’ who wanted to see the 
blood and gruel from the match (Downey, 2007: 215).  
Other techniques also transformed fighters’ bodies from sluggish and slow to technical 
and efficient. The creation of the boxing bag, the refinement of gym training spaces, as well as 
timings for bouts changed boxing into a regulatory sporting practice. The boxing ring itself was a 
technical artifice. Measuring 24-feet the ring had to be erected on the ground or a stage unlike 
spaces of the duel or prize fight that were informal, uncontained and conducted in a field or 
cobbled together in another private area. As writer George Bernard Shaw (1882) noted, ‘…a 
convention drew up by which it became practically legal to make a citizen’s nose bleed by a 
punch from the gloved fist, and illegal to do the same thing with the naked knuckles.’ ‘What has 
happened’, he reported, ‘…has been the virtual legalization of prize-fighting under cover of the 
boxing glove’. ‘This is exactly what public opinion desires. We do not like fighting; but we like 
looking on at fights: therefore, we require a law that will punish the prize-fighter if he hits us and 
secure us the protection of the police whilst we sit in a comfortable hall watching him hit another 
prize-fighter.’ In short, boxing did not end gambling and other divine and excessive practices: 
science sanitized boxing, transforming the boxer from animal to human. Boxers embodied the 
secular science and folded within themselves the ritualistic excesses that governance sought to 
contain. The boxer’s body was both scientific and religious; it was ‘quasi-sacrificial’ (Wacquant 
(1995: 492). Boxer’s physiology is refashioned ‘…into an ideal athletic tool, at least until 
deterioration exceeds their recuperative powers” (Downey, 2007: 220). 
Emergent medical knowledge also resulted in medical policing. New techniques 
medicalized sports injury. Concussion, identified by autopsy, was linked to ‘slugging’ as slow 
boxing without technique, as opposed to technical, safer styles of boxing. As the physician 
Martland described in 1928, ‘punch drunk often affects boxers of the slugging type’ (p. 1103). 
Thus, mundane technologies that founded scientific boxing overlapped with medical 
advancements to frame technical conduct as superior, and to legitimize boxing as a social 
practice.  
Mundane technologies also intersected with extraordinary technological advancements 
such as the printing press which helped promote fighters and facilitate their rising popularity. 
Fighters such as Gentleman Jim amassed support as their achievements were widely published. 
Newspaper coverage and its expanding circulation paralleling technological advancements 
through wired and then wireless communication contributed to the superseding of boxing over 
prize fighting. Rule-bound forms of scientific boxing considered morally and socially acceptable 
grew as its promotion through newsprint generated broader interest in matches, and subsequently 
increased revenue.  Stories of fighters added to the popular appeal of the sport and identities of 
boxers fed their media spectacle. 
Boxing promoters were also economically invested in boxing’s presentation as clean and 
gentlemanly. Publishers like Richard Fox, proprietor of the National Police Gazette, a paper that 
covered the popular sports like boxing and sold thousands of copies in the US, was hugely 
influential in boxing’s status and economic success. Fox himself backed fighters and would put 
up money for bouts, with the popularity of the Gazette generating much revenue from sales. 
Fox’s role in cultivating celebrity fighters garnered even more revenue as he could sell stories on 
those such as Sullivan throughout their fighting careers (Reel, 2006: 135). Those like Fox 
recognized that it was in their own, as well as in the broader social interest, to rationalize boxing 
as ‘gentlemanly’ to ‘silence criticism’ and maintain an income stream (Reel, 2006:124). 
Boxing’s legitimation rested on the ability of those involved in its practice, promotion and 
governance to ensure the sport’s regulation in the face of existing criticism, while also giving 
expression to fighters. It had to make space for constructions of violence - the grit that would 
‘sell’ and that attracted boxers and those spectators who were gripped to follow them and to 
gamble on them. As Wacquant neatly puts it, ‘the “sweet science of boxing” did not only emerge 
from pugilistic bare knuckles; those who wielded political and economic power also had to 
transition from the “flesh peddlers” of pugilism to “honest businessmen” (1998: 3). 
 
From science back to slugging 
The balance of grit and polished appearance was troublesome and difficult to maintain. Scientific 
boxing also received backlash, and public interest was conflicted. While boxing’s containment of 
violence to the ring between consenting individuals was lauded, audiences demanded more 
visible and carnal forms of excess. This spectator-demanded excess has been interpreted as a 
desire for the viewing of violence. Writing in the 1800s, George Bernard Shaw even noted the 
spectators did not want to see skill defeating violence: they wanted to see violence drawing 
blood and pounding its way to a savage and exciting victory in the shortest possible time (the old 
prize fight usually dragged on for hours and was ended by exhaustion rather than victory).  
So did most of the judges, as well as the publishers. Fighters wanted a knock-out. 
Shaw, like others, noted the ‘old hypocrisy of the gloved hand’, that ‘…spares nothing but the 
public conscience’. People wanted a ‘real’ fight. The artificialness of scientific boxing distanced 
it from the carnal expressions that the spectating populace wanted to witness and feel 
themselves. Boxing thus had an economic as well as a social problem to resolve. To thrive as a 
business boxing had to sell itself with two diverging goals: it needed to satiate the excessive 
mass appeal of the blood sport of prize fighting but also had to satisfy middle-class morals. 
Clubs then tended to strike a balance between enforcing new rules including the gloved hand, 
while holding onto bare-knuckle prize fighting’s heritage. In the 1892 fight between Corbett and 
Sullivan, the fighters agreed that “The gloves shall be the smallest the club will allow” 
(Naughton, 1910: 10). 
One of the draws of sport that Shaw identified was its very unscientific, ‘chance’ like 
element. Even when one performs the ‘miracles of “science”..., ‘…one of the fascinations of 
boxing to the gambler (who is the main pillar of the sporting world) is that it is a game of 
hardihood, pugnacity and skill all at the mercy of chance’. A craving for the divine or excess 
spills out into public space like a carnal desire for forms of human interaction and being that are 
not representable within systems of rational governance. While the urge to roll back rules in 
boxing and other combat sports has been interpreted as a spectator-driven desire to view violence 
(Downey, 2007, 2014; Shaw, 1882), one could also understand this desire more broadly as a 
longing to see the art, rather than science, of combat. It is a desire to experience the excessive, 
affective form of intersubjective corporeal movement that codification and technical prescription 
may preclude and that immunizing governance mechanisms restrict (Esposito, 2008).  
The scientization and sanitization of boxing – or what Elias called ‘sportization’ – was 
thus tied to the viewing public’s desire to see the sport and invest in it for viewing pleasure. This 
development was not however linear, and the sanitization also enabled the development of the 
professional sport of boxing alongside its newly acceptable amateur cousin. For example, in the 
US, John Y. McKane, chief of police at Coney Island, and a prize fighting enthusiast, was keen 
to bring professional fights to boxing clubs. These club matches were lucrative, but maintained 
their proper balance and avoided prosecution through advertisements that claimed they were 
‘sparring for scientific scores’ (Somers, cited in Kim, 2010: 136). In England, bare-knuckle 
boxing became a derogatory term and instead the term ‘pugilism’ or ‘boxing’ was used to refer 
to professional fighting (Kim, 2010: 136-7). The rationalization of boxing through the amateur 
movement and the gloved hand paved the way for professionalism and the lucrative market 
economy of boxing to take off within legal limits.   
 
Conclusion 
Modern mixed or hybrid forms of martial arts now appear to have infiltrated the space of the 
boxing market economy. Mixed martial arts (MMA) generates vast revenues from fights that 
promise combats between subjects in gladiatorial-like feats. While still scientifically sanctioned 
within a controlled fight space and timed bouts, ‘cage fighters’ now use even smaller grappling 
gloves than boxing had introduced and appear to offer ‘more brutal and less regulated forms of 
violence’ (Brent & Kraska, 2010). Brent & Kraska argue that MMA is expressive of a visceral 
reaction to a highly rationalized and regulated society. Arguably this conclusion is fitting with 
the thesis developed throughout this paper: the emergence of these new hybrid sports may be 
interpreted as symptomatic of a drive of life to exceed the biopolitical immunizing protection and 
regulation of life.  
‘Professor in the Cage’, Jonathan Gottschall (2015), describes fights as ‘ritual combats’ 
engaged with by human and animal. They keep violence maintained in the social order. 
Describing human combat like a ‘monkey dance,’ he argues that humans, like animals, need 
ritual combats to settle disputes in ways that cannot be resolved through deferral to governance 
systems. Much like Elias’ view of boxing, and Brent & Kraska’s view of MMA, violence for 
Gottschall is an innate psychological drive that is curbed through a civilizing process that 
contains violence within normative and acceptable formations of expression. For Brent & 
Kraska, the emergence and popularity of MMA “represent(s) an ongoing dialectic between 
civilization and barbarism” (360). But, as I have argued, while one might conclude that the rise 
of MMA is expressive of a visceral reaction to a highly rationalized and regulated society, one 
might also conclude that the feelings and expressions of boxers and MMA practitioners, framed 
as violent, are not innate but are made. Where corporeal subjects are naturally excessive, these 
subjects are not necessarily innately violent nor ‘barbarians’ per se; instead, their intensities 
exceed the descriptive containment of concepts like violence. Violence is a construct used to 
capture some practices considered to exceed socially acceptable norms of conduct, and which 
threaten to undo a logic of biopolitical governance that replicates the protection of the proper 
boundaries around persons (Esposito, 2008).  
As a discourse, science contributes to the making of persons who are knowable and 
governable subjects. Scientific principles, technologies of governance, and mundane 
technologies construct and shape practices that are criminalized or legalized in a biopolitical 
context that foregrounds the well-being of the public and the subsequent control of violence and 
bodily excesses. Mundane technologies played a significant role in legitimating scientific boxing 
that could conform to, and contain the excessive corporealities of boxing within this governance 
rationale.  
Yet, as Esposito suggests, life’s protection emerges at the expense of life itself: vital ways 
of being are what drive us. Scientific frameworks that curb life’s excesses in the name of 
protection also stifle its very development. Science and mundane technologies, as they appeal to 
the curbing of excess, much like the police sciences and medical sciences, also must fold this 
excess within themselves, to secularize it. Sovereignty secularizes violence within the body of 
the King or Queen, who can enact violence and control his or her subject’s excesses. Biopolitics 
curbs its excesses through fostering practices that prevent risk, that instate the security of 
subjects, and that make subjects responsible for the control of their own excesses within the 
limitations of law that promotes and values the protection of individual and collective human 
life. Duelling practices threatened this order of things by controlling excesses outside the 
constraints of law that did not respect boundaries around persons. Prize fighting, likewise, 
encouraged excesses through allegedly disrupting public order. Mundane technologies, by 
contrast, made boxing into a strictly human practice that controlled excess. Far from scientific 
knowledge of boxing aiding the sport into a civilizing process, the relationship between science 
and the desire of subjects for more carnal experiences keep fighting sports in a liminal space 
between technical, rational and modern performances and intense, fleshly, over-spillings. 
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